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1 Introduction
The solution concept of Nash equilibrium in voting games has the drawback
of admitting predictions that seem unreasonable. For example, in voting
games with more than three candidates even if every voter has the same
preferences, the least preferred alternative might win in a Nash equilibrium.
Indeed, this is true not only with plurality rule1 but with any scoring rule2.
The reason this problem arises with Nash equilibria is that it allows any
possible beliefs on the part of voters, as long as they are consistent. For
example, suppose that it is common knowledge that a candidate, A is worst
for all voters. Nevertheless, there is a Nash equilibrium where every voter
votes for A because he believes that all other voters will vote for A. One
easy way of eliminating this equilibrium is to require voting strategies to be
weakly undominated. Unfortunately this requirement is not sufficient to give
a unique prediction. This problem was motivated first in a preceding article
(Dhillon and Lockwood, 1999) for the case of Plurality Rule only.
However, all the problems that arise with Nash equilibria in plurality rule
games also arise in other scoring rule games. We therefore study the applica-
tion of the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies to all scoring
rules. A game that yields a unique result after the iterated elimination of
dominated strategies is called Dominance Solvable (DS). Farquarson (1969)
called this procedure “sophisticated voting”, and he called a voting game
“determinate” if sophisticated voting led to a unique outcome.
Why study Dominance Solvability? If we consider the fact that most of
the scoring rules we consider (except Negative Plurality Rule) choose the
Condorcet winner whenever the sufficient conditions for the game to be DS
1Voters can vote for only one candidate and the candidate with the maximum votes
wins the election.
2A scoring rule is a voting rule which specifies the vote vectors that voters can use, and
then assigns a score to each candidate based on the total number of votes that a candidate
gets. The candidate(s) with the highest score wins the election.
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are satisfied, we could interpret Dominance Solvability of the scoring rule
voting game as being linked to the manipulability of a voting game. Thus,
whenever the sufficient conditions for the game to be DS are satisfied, the
outcome includes (except for Negative Plurality Rule) the Condorcet Winner,
i.e. the outcome is the same as if voters voted sincerely. In this sense we are
comparing different scoring rules in terms of this criterion of manipulability.
Iterated Admissibility or iterated elimination of weakly dominated strate-
gies has been criticised by a number of authors, as a strong theoretical justi-
fication for it has been elusive. A number of recent articles however provide
both learning and common knowledge justifications for it (see e.g. Marx
(1999) and Gilli (2002)).
We restrict ourselves to the more realistic case of three candidates or
three alternatives. Experimental studies (see for example Ho, Camerer and
Weigelt, (1998)) have pointed out that although iterated dominance is one
of the most basic principles in game theory, in general “...at the risk of
overgeneralising across games that are too different experimental results show
that subjects rarely violate dominance but usually stop after one– three levels
of iteration.” For reasons that will become obvious, the number of iterations
in scoring rule voting games are closely linked to the number of candidates.
Thus, we feel it is more relevant to study the case of three alternatives. The
flavour of the results would be qualitatively the same with more alternatives3.
The scoring rules we study in this paper are: Negative Plurality Rule (NPR),
Approval Voting (AV), Borda Rule (BR) and Relative Utilitarianism (RU).
We also compare the results on PR (Dhillon and Lockwood, 1999) to the
results of the three other scoring rules.
Our main results are: (1) A generalisation of the results on Plurality Rule
voting (Dhillon and Lockwood, 1999), in the sense that we derive sufficient
conditions for scoring rule voting games to be DS in terms of one statistic
3Buenrostro has separately proved generalisations for some of the scoring rules studied
in this paper.
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of the game: the degree of agreement on the best or the worst alternative,
(2) A classification of scoring rule voting games based on the strength of the
conditions required for DS shows that Approval Voting performs quite well
relative to other rules. Intuitively, this is because it is the least restrictive in
terms of the strategies allowed to voters and (3) When the game satisfies the
sufficient conditions for Dominance Solvability we investigate if the unique
outcome is also the Condorcet Winner. The scoring rule games for which the
Condorcet Winner is not chosen by the iterated elimination of dominated
strategies even when it exists and the sufficient conditions for Dominance
Solvability are satisfied are not very desirable rules according to this criterion.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
defines concepts and notation that will be used in the rest of the paper for
the one stage voting game with three alternatives. Sections 3,4 and 5 offer a
general classification of scoring rule voting games according to the sufficient
conditions for DS. Section 6 compares some of the well known Scoring Rule
voting games like Plurality Rule, Negative Plurality Rule, Approval Voting.
Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
In the following analysis we assume there are three alternatives, and an
arbitrary number, n > 3, of voters. This is a simplified case of the general
voting game and it is the simplest case where strategic voting can occur. It is
common in the literature to compare voting systems with three alternatives;
for example, Myerson and Weber (1993), Myerson (2002). Also, often major
political elections have no more than three candidates. We believe that the
results would not be qualitatively different with more candidates.
A scoring rule is characterised by a set C ⊂ IR3, which represents the set
of feasible ballots or vote vectors a voter is permitted to submit (Myerson,
2002). A vote vector, c = (c1, c2, c3) represents a ballot that gives c1 points
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to candidate one, c2 points to candidate two etc. The vote-vectors of all
voters are added up to obtain a total point score for each candidate. The
winning set of candidates is those that get the maximum point score. If
there is a tie, we allow all candidates in the winning set to be chosen with
equal probability. We assume that the set C is a non empty subset of IR3.
Every voter can choose from the same feasible set C so the scoring rules we
consider are anonymous and neutral. We assume w.l.o.g. scoring rules to
be normalised, 0 ≤ ci ≤ 1, for all i. Thus in all feasible vote vectors, the
candidate who is top ranked gets 1 point and the candidate who is worst
ranked gets a point 0. Scoring rules differ only in the number of points that
can be given to the middle ranked candidate.
Examples of scoring rules are: Plurality Rule (PR),Negative Plurality
Rule (NPR), Approval Voting (AV), Borda Rule (BR) and Relative Utilitar-
ianism (RU)(Dhillon and Mertens, 1999).
Among these, PR, NPR, and AV allow ci ∈ {0, 1} only, while RU al-
lows any ci ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, for three alternatives, normalisation and no
indifferences imply that permitted vote vectors in any scoring rule r ∈
{PR,NPR,AV,BR,RU} are all possible permutations of the vector (1, sr, 0)
where sr ∈ Sr ⊂ [0, 1]. The set Sr characterises the scoring rule r. Thus
SPR = 0, SNPR = 1, SBR = 1/2, SAV = {0, 1} and SRU = [0, 1].
The social choice literature usually considers scoring rules which allow
singleton sets Sr. Our definition of a scoring rule is more general: we allow
Sr to be any subset of [0, 1]. We introduce here the Relative Utilitarian (RU)
scoring rule: RU is a social welfare function that consists of normalising
individual (von-Neumann Morgentern) utilities between 0 and 1 and then
adding them (Dhillon and Mertens, 1999). If interpreted as a scoring rule
RU calls for voters to submit ballots that allow the middle ranked alternative
to be given any point betweeen 0 and 1. We can derive any scoring rule from
RU by suitably restricting the strategy space.
We assume that there are no abstentions. With costless voting, abstention
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is weakly dominated and therefore deleted in the first stage for all voters. We
also assume strict preferences, so that vectors of the form (c, c, ..., c) are not
permitted in all the voting games we consider.
Let us now define the voting game Γr corresponding to scoring rule r.
The strategies of voters are the set of possible vote vectors allowed in any
scoring rule. Let vri ∈ V ri represent the vote vectors allowed to individual iin
scoring rule r, where r = PR,NPR,AV,BR, RU. The profile of vote vectors,
one for each individual, is denoted v. The score for a particular candidate a,
corresponding to a vector of votes vr is denoted ωa(vr) (or just ωa when it is
clear which vote vector we are considering). A score profile (corresponding
to a vote vector,vr) is a vector ωr = (ω1, ω2, ω3), where ωi represents the total
point score of candidate i. Ωr denotes the space of scoring vectors ωr, for
scoring rule r.
Let W (vr) denote the set of winning candidates given the vote vector
vr. The payoffs are given by the expected utility over the set of winning
candidates.
Let the set of alternatives be X = {x, y, z} and the set of voters be N
such that |N | = n.
Define W (vr) = {a ∈ X|ωa(vr) ≥ max(ωb(vr), ωc(vr)),∀b, c ∈ X} as the
Winning Set for a given profile vr.
Define L(vr) = {a ∈ X|ωa ≤ min(ωb, ωc),∀b, c} as the Losing set for a
given profile vr.
We will impose the following regularity condition (Dhillon and Lockwood
1999) which ensures that the order of deletion of weakly dominated strategies
does not matter(see Marx and Swinkels’(1997) Transference of Decisionmaker
Indifference (TDI) condition which is sufficent to ensure that the order of
deletion does not matter: If A.1 is satisfied, then TDI is satisied):
A1. For all vr, v
′
r s.t. W (vr) 6= W (v′r), ui(vr) 6= ui(v′r), i ∈ N
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This says that no player is indifferent between any two different winsets4.
Let Na(N
′
a) ⊂ N with a ∈ {x, y, z} represent the set of individuals that
rank a as the worst (best) alternative and let na(n
′
a) be the number of voters
in this set. Let qa =
na
n
and q′a =
n′a
n
.
In what follows we focus only on pure strategies that survive iterated
deletion of weakly dominated strategies (since we are interested in dominance
solvability). In the rest of the paper we suppress the subscript r in vr, ωr when
it is clear which scoring rule is being discussed in a a particular section, and
we will use vi, i ∈ N, to denote the vote vector for voter i under the voting
rule that is being analysed. Let v−i represent the voting profile of all players
except player i. Let ωa(v−i) denote the total points that a ∈ X gets in
the profile v−i. Finally, say that in game Γ, preferences are polarized over
alternative a ∈ X if there is an M ⊂ N such that all i ∈ M rank a highest,
and i ∈ N/M rank a lowest. Preferences over alternative a are non-polarized
otherwise. Finally, let Γi denote the reduced game after i rounds of the
elimination of weakly dominated strategies and W∞ denote the outcome
when no further iterated elimination is possible.
Fix a scoring rule, r. Let pa(v) denote the probability that alternative
a is in the winset given profile v. We define a voter i to be pivotal on a set
S ⊂ X, if ∀a ∈ S, ∃ a strategy vi(a) ∈ Vi such that pa(v−i) 6= pa(v), where
v is the profile (v−i, vi(a)) (note that the order of vote vectors in the profile
does not matter as scoring rule voting games are anonymous), and ∀a 6∈ S,
for all strategies v′i ∈ Vi, p(a)(v−i) = pa(v′), where v′ = (v−i, v′i). We say that
a strategy vi is at least as good as strategy v
′
i for voter i if strategy vi does not
decrease the probability that an alternative which is higher ranked by voter
i is in the winset, relative to strategy v′i, for any profile of (pure) strategies of
other voters. We denote the set of alternatives which are condorcet winners
as XCW and a CW is denoted as aCW ∈ XCW .
Finally we often use the short form UBR for Unique Best Response.
4A1 implies that no voter is indifferent between any pair of alternatives.
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We focus on sufficient conditions that require only ordinal information on
preferences5. In the next section we show that most scoring rules have very
similar sufficient conditions for DS. In particular we show that most scoring
rules can be categorised according to whether the sufficient conditions can be
expressed in terms of sufficient agreement on the best alternative or sufficient
agreement on the worst alternative.
3 A classification of scoring rule voting games
The idea behind strategic voting is that individuals try to differentiate max-
imally between the alternatives that are tied given the vote vectors of all
other voters. This has to be consistent with the type of vote vectors they
are permitted in the scoring rule. We can thus deduce something about the
undominated vectors. In PR, voters have a single vote (i.e. ci = 1 for any
i implies cj = 0,∀j 6= 1. ). Thus if they are pivotal over any set involving
the worst ranked alternative, they must give it zero, and if not pivotal on
this alternative they may as well give it zero points. Therefore the search for
sufficient conditions for dominance solvability of the PR voting game is es-
sentially a search for conditions under which we can reduce the set of possible
winning candidates. This idea extends to other scoring rules as well.
For scoring rule r let sr denote max s ∈ Sr, and sr denote min s ∈ Sr.
Obviously if Sr is a singleton then sr = sr = sr. Denote Σ(vr) = ωx(vr) +
ωy(vr) +ωz(vr). Note that for any scoring rule n(1 + sr) ≤ Σ(vr) ≤ n(1 + sr).
It is quite intuitive that with three alternatives, voters would never give
less than sr to their best alternative and never give more than sr to their
worst alternative. This is what the next proposition shows.
Proposition 1 In the game Γr the only strategies that are undominated for
a voter i are those that give cj ≥ sr to his top ranked alternative j ∈ X and
5Although we shall see later that this is not quite true for Borda Rule.
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ck ≤ sr to his worst ranked alternative k ∈ X.
See Appendix Section A.1 for the proof.
Thus the first stage of iterated elimination leads to the reduced game
denoted by Γ1r for scoring rule r, where the strategies are of the form (sr, 1, 0),
(1, sr, 0) and (1, 0, sr).
Our sufficient conditions for DS revolve around finding the conditions
under which we can reduce the set of possible candidates that can win the
election. This could happen in two ways: either we can eliminate the can-
didate who is worst ranked by most voters or we can say something about
the candidates who cannot lose if there is sufficient agreement on the best
and then use that to reduce the possible outcomes. We call these two sets
of sufficient conditions Agreement on the Worst and Agreement on the Best
respectively. We show that if sr < 1/2, then a scoring rule voting game is
DS if there is “sufficient” agreement on the worst and if sr > 1/2 then a
scoring rule voting game may be DS if there is sufficient agreement on the
best. The conditions for Agreement on the best and Agreement on the worst
are not symmetric– the reason is that agreement on the best only helps us
to eliminate candidates in the Losing Set while we are interested in reducing
the possible winning outcomes.
4 Agreement on the worst:
4.1 Scoring rules with sr < 1/2
W.l.o.g let z be the candidate that most voters rank worst6. Recall that nz
is the number of voters who rank z worst. In what follows we will drop the
subscript r from vr and use W synonymously with W (v), L synonymously
6This is uniquely defined if z is a Condorcet Loser. Whenever our sufficient conditions
are satisfied, this is indeed the case.
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with L(v). This makes the notation simpler.
In the next theorem we derive the sufficient conditions for Dominance
Solvability of Scoring Rule voting games with sr < 1/2. We know from
Proposition 1 that voters will give a minimal score to their worst candidate in
the undominated game. Consider a voter i who has z as his worst candidate.
If there are sufficiently many voters who rank z worst, then z can get at most
nzsr+(n−nz). Now if sr < 12 , this means that z can never be in the winning
set, so that even the voters who do not have z as the worst candidate will
not waste their votes on z. Thus the gameis reduced to a game between x
and y and the CW must win. This is what we show in this section.
Theorem 1 (A) If sr < 1/2, then the game Γr is DS if nz >
n(2−sr)
3(1−sr) . (B)Also
whenever the sufficient conditions for DS are satisfied, (i) W∞ contains at
most two alternatives,(ii) if n is odd, a unique CW, aCW exists and W∞ =
{aCW}; (iii) if n is even, at least one CW exists and W∞ = XCW .
Before we prove this theorem we need a few lemmas. Proofs of all lemmas
are in the Appendix.
Lemma 2: Assume sr < 1/2. If nz >
n(2−sr)
3(1−sr) then W ⊂ {{x}, {y}, {xy}}.
Corollary to Lemma 2: If sr =
1
2
, and nz = n then W (v) ∈ {{x}, {x, y}, {y},
{x, y, z}}, for all v ∈ V .
Lemma 3: Consider a voter i ∈ Nz such that x i y i z. Assume
W ⊂ {{x}, {y}, {xy}}. Then either (i) the strategy (1, 0, sr) weakly dom-
inates strategies (1, sr, 0) and (sr, 1, 0) for sr > 0, or (ii)all strategies of i are
equivalent.
Lemma 4: Consider a voter i 6∈ Nz such that z i x i y. Assume W ⊂
{{x}, {y}, {xy}}. Then either (i) the strategy (1, 0, sr) (denoted vi) weakly
dominates strategies (0, sr, 1) (denoted v
′
i) and (sr, 0, 1) (denoted v
′′
i ) for sr >
0, or (ii) all strategies of i are equivalent.
Proof of Theorem 1 (A): Consider i ∈ Nz. W.l.o.g assume x i y i z. By
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Proposition 1, his undominated strategies (or his strategies in the game Γ1r
are of the form (sr, 1, 0), (1, sr, 0) and (1, 0, sr). Consider a voter j 6∈ Nz such
that z i x i y. By Proposition 1, his undominated strategies are (1, 0, sr),
(0, sr, 1) and (sr, 0, 1) By Lemma 2, we know that W ⊂ {{x}, {y}, {x, y}}.
Consider voter i above. By lemma 3, if strategy (1, 0, sr) weakly dom-
inates any of the strategies (1, sr, 0) and (sr, 1, 0) for sr 6= 0, then we can
remove all such strategies . Similarly for voter j above if strategy (1, 0, sr)
weakly dominates strategies (0, sr, 1) and (sr, 0, 1) for some sr then we can
remove these strategies in the second round of iterated deletion to reach the
reduced game Γ2r.
In the game Γ2r, either some voters have only one strategy remaining and
this is the one that gives 1 to the best candidate out of x, y and 0 to the
other, or all remaining strategies for all remaining voters are equivalent. This
means that we can choose the strategy that gives 1 to the best candidate out
of x, y and 0 to the other for all voters (since whichever strategy we choose
the outcome is the same for all voters). Thus all voters have only one strategy
left and the game is DS. 
Proof of Theorem 1(B): For the second part, observe that there z is the
unique Condorcet Loser in these voting games. Hence there must be a CW,
which is unique if n is odd. By the proof of theorem 1, we know that all
voters vote sincerely between x and y in the reduced game Γ2r, while z gets
n(sr) votes. Thus max(ωz) <
n
2
while if there is a unique CW (say x) then
min(ωx) >
n
2
. If n is even and both x and y are CW then ωx = ωy =
n
2
.
Hence the winning set is the set of CW’s.

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4.2 Scoring Rules with sr =
1
2
Let, w.l.o.g, nz be the largest number of voters who have the same worst
alternative. As in Dhillon and Lockwood (1999) we say that i ∈ N has
dominated middle alternative (DMA) preferences if he prefers a lottery with
equal probabilities over all three alternatives to his middle-ranked alternative.
This section essentially shows that when sr increases to
1
2
the degree of
agreement required on the same worst alternative increases. The reason is
that our sufficient conditions are conditions that ensure that z will never be
in the winning set if voters use iteratively undominated strategies.
Theorem 2 (A)If sr =
1
2
, the game Γr is DS if nz = n and either (i) n is
odd, (ii) n is even and n′x 6= n′y or (iii) all voters have DMA preferences. (B)
If the conditions in (A) hold then at least one CW exists and W∞ includes
XCW .
Proof of Theorem 2(A) Using the Corollary to Lemma 2, W (v) ∈ {{x},{x, y},{y},{x, y, z}},
for all v ∈ V .
Note that if nz = n Proposition 1 implies that max(ωz(v)) =
n
2
.
Suppose that ∃ v such that W (v) = {x, y, z} . This implies that ωx(v) =
ωy(v) = ωz(v). Such a profile exists iff all i ∈ N give 12 to z. But if all i ∈ N
give 1
2
to z, they must all be using the strategy which gives 1 to the best
alternative and 0 to the second ranked.Since ωx(v) = ωy(v) = ωz(v) it must
be that n′x = n
′
y =
n
2
and therefore n is even.
Thus if n is odd, or n′x 6= n′y, no such profile exists, and {x, y, z} 6∈
W (v),for any v ∈ V . Then the result follows using Lemmas 3 and 4 and the
game is DS (following the same proof as for the case sr < 1/2.). We now
consider the case when n is even and n′x = n
′
y =
n
2
.
Let i ∈ Nz be such that (w.l.o.g) x i y i z.. By Proposition 1 the
remaining strategies for such a player in the game Γ1r are: vi = (1, 0, 1/2),
v˜i = (1, sr, 0) and v̂i = (sr, 1, 0). It is sufficient to show that vi weakly
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dominates the two other strategies in the case W (v) = {x, y, z} (since the
rest follows from the proof of Theorem 1.).
Now assume that n is even, n′x = n
′
y and all the voters have DMA pref-
erences. Let v−i be such that W (v) = {x, y, z} , this implies that ωx(v−i) +
1 = ωy(v−i) = ωz(v−i) + 12 . Therefore, the only possible outcome for v˜ is
W (v˜) = {y} and since i has DMA preferences strategy vi is at least as good
as v˜i. Analogously, the only possible outcome for v̂ is W (v̂) = {y} and since
i has DMA preferences strategy vi is at least as good as v̂i.
If there exists a profile v−i such that strategy (1, 0, 12) is strictly better
than strategy (1, sr, 0) for any sr ∈ Sr and there exists a profile such that
(1, 0, 1
2
) is strictly better than strategy (sr, 1, 0), then we can eliminate the
dominated strategies. Otherwise all strategies are equivalent and we can
choose (1, 0, 1
2
).
Therefore, if nz = n and either (i), (ii) or (iii) in Theorem 2 hold then the
only strategy that is undominated in Γ1r for all voters is the strategy that
gives 1 to the best and 1/2 to the worst alternative.

Proof of Theorem 2(B): If the sufficient conditions for DS are satisfied,
there is a Condorcet Loser (z), so clearly there is a unique CW if n is odd
and if n is even then both x and y are CW’s. The proof of part (A) shows
that all voters are left with the strategy that gives 1 to the best and 1
2
to z.
Thus, the winning set coincides with the CW if n is odd, and if n is even all
three alternatives get equal votes so the winning set includes the Condorcet
winners.

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5 Agreement on the Best
W.l.o.g let x be the alternative that a plurality of voters rank best. As
shown by Proposition 1 the reduced game Γ1r gives a maximum of sr to
the worst alternative and a minimum of sr to the best alternative. Thus
min(ωx) = n
′
xsr.
Recall n(1+sr) ≤ Σ(v) ≤ n(1+sr). Recall too that the strategies that sur-
vive in Γ1r for i such that x i y i z are of the form (1, 0, sr); (1, sr, 0); (sr, 1, 0).
When a sufficiently large number of voters agree that x is the best can-
didate, then we might conjecture that x is always in the winning set, and
the only question is whether it is uniquely in the winning set or not. This is
indeed the case: consider Negative Plurality Rule which is the worst scoring
rule in the sense that sr = 1. Even if all voters agree that x is the best
each voter still has two undominated strategies remaining, so that the out-
come could be {x, y} or {x, z}. Indeed, this is true even if all voters have
exactly the same preferences. The co-ordination problem is particularly bad
with NPR. We derive some sufficient conditions for NPR in Section 6. On the
other hand when sr < 1, there is some hope that the game is DS if sufficiently
many voters agree on the same best alternative. The exact conditions are
derived below. If sr is less than
1
2
, then even if all voters agreed on the same
best candidate, we still could not ensure that that candidate would always
be in the winning set. That is why we need sr ≥ 12 , to be able to derive
sufficient conditions based on agreement on the best.
5.1 Scoring Rules when sr >
1
2 :
Theorem 3:(A) Let sr > 1/2 and sr < 1. If n
′
x > max[
n(1+sr)
3sr
, n
2−sr ] and
sr ≥ sr then the Scoring rule game is DS and x is the unique winner. (B) If
the sufficient conditions are satisfed, the unique CW is x.
Before we prove this theorem, we need a few lemmas. We assume from
14
now on that sr > 1/2.
Lemma 5: If n′x >
n(1+sr)
3sr
then L ∈ {{y}, {z}, {y, z}}.
Comment 1: Thus we can deduce that ωx > min(ωy, ωz) for all profiles v.
Corollary 1 to Lemma 5: If n′x >
n(1+sr)
3sr
then W (v) ∈ {{x}, {y}, {z}, {x, y}{x, z}},∀v.
The proof is obvious using Comment 1 above: {y, z} and {x, y, z} cannot be
in the winning set for any profile v.
Corollary 2 to Lemma 5: If sr =
1
2
and n′x = n then L ∈ {{y}, {z},{x, y, z},{y, z}}.
Lemma 6: Let i ∈ N ′x, such that x i y i z. If L ⊂ {{y}, {z}, {y, z}},
then either (a) strategies vi = (sr, 1, 0) and v
′
i = (1, sr, 0) are both weakly
dominated by strategy v˜i = (1, sr, 0) or (b) all strategies are equivalent for i.
If strategy v˜i weakly dominates strategy vi (v
′
i) then we can eliminate vi(v
′
i).
Otherwise, the two are equivalent and we can choose v˜i.
Thus the reduced game Γ2r is the game where all i ∈ N ′x have strategies
(1, 0, sr) and (1, sr, 0) remaining.
Lemma 7: In the game Γ2r, if sr < 1, and n
′
x >
n
2−sr then the Scoring rule
game is DS and x is the unique winner.
Corollary to Lemma 7: In the game Γ2r if sr <
1
2
, then if n′x >
2n
3
, the game
is DS and x is the unique winner.
Proof of Theorem 3: Denote n′T =
n(1+sr)
3sr
. The Corollary to Lemma 5
shows that whenever n′x > n
′
T then {y, z},{x, y, z}6∈ W (v), for any v ∈ V.
Then Lemma 6 tells us that in this case, all i ∈ N ′x will give 1 to x. Lemma
7 shows that if n′x > n
′
t, then W = {x} and the game is DS. Thus if n′x >
max[n′T , n
′
t] all conditions are satisfied so the game is DS and x is the unique
winner. 
Corollary 1 to Theorem 3:Let sr > 1/2 and sr <
1
2
. If n′x >
n(1+sr)
3sr
then
the Scoring rule game is DS and x is the unique winner.
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Proof of Corollary 1 to Theorem 3: Since sr ∈ (12 , 1] and sr ∈ [0, 12), we
have inf(n′T ) =
2n
3
= sup(n′t) =
2n
3
, so if n′x >
2n
3
the game is DS and x is the
unique winner for all sr, sr, in the intervals considered.

Corollary 2 to Theorem 3: If sr > 1/2 and sr <
1
2
, and n′a >
n(1+sr)
3sr
then a
is the unique Condorcet Winner and is the only determinate outcome.
The proof is obvious. 
5.2 Scoring Rules with sr =
1
2 .
Theorem 4:If sr =
1
2
, and n′x = n, the scoring rule game is DS and the
unique winner is the Condorcet winner.
Proof of Theorem 4: The Corollary to Lemma 5 shows that L(v) ∈
{{y}, {z}, {y, z}, {x, y, z}}. Thus min(ωx)(v) ≥ min(ωy(v), ωz(v)) for any
profile v. This means that W (v) ∈{{x}, {y}, {z},{x, y}, {x, z}, {x, y, z}},∀v.
Consider an individual i ∈ N ′x such that x i y i z. It is easy to see that
Lemma 6 applies in this case as well when L(v) ∈ {{y}, {z}, {y, z}}. It is suf-
ficient, therefore to show that Lemma 6 holds when L(v) = {x, y, z}. Thus,
let vi = (sr, 1, 0) and v
′
i = (1, sr, 0) and v˜i = (1, sr, 0). Let (vi, v−i) = v,
(v′i, v−i) = v
′, (v˜i, v−i) = v˜. If W (v) = W (v′) = {x, y, z} then W (v˜) = {x}.
Thus by the proof of Lemma 6, we can eliminate strategies (sr, 1, 0) and
(1, sr, 0). The only strategies that remain are those that give 1 to x. Since
ωx(v) ≥ n′x = n, for all v while maxv∈V (ωy(v), ωz(v)) = n′xsr = nsr, the
game is DS and x is the unique winner, since sr ≤ sr = 12 .

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6 Results for Scoring Rules: PR,AV,RU,BR,
NPR
What can we say about sufficient conditions for DS of the scoring rules that
are familiar in the literature? Well, our first result is that the sufficient
conditions for DS for both AV and RU are exactly the same! Thus, there is
no loss in restricting strategies to be sr ∈ {0, 1}.
Corollary to Theorems 1 and 3:The PR game is DS if nz >
2n
3
. The
AV and RU voting games are DS if either (i)nz >
2n
3
or (ii) n′x >
2n
3
. If the
sufficient conditions for DS are satisfied, there exists a CW and the winning
set coincides with the set of CW’s for all three scoring rules.
For Borda Rule we have the following result:
Corollary to Theorems 2 and 4:The BR game is DS if EITHER (A)
nz = n and either (i) n is odd (ii) n is even and n
′
x 6= n′y or (ii) all voters
have DMA preferences, OR (B)n′x = n. If these sufficient conditions are
satisfied, in case A(i) there is a unique CW and it is the unique winning
alternative. In case A(ii) if all voters are equally divided between x and y
then all three alternatives will be in the winning set. In case (B) the unique
CW coincides with the winning set.
6.1 Sufficient Conditions for non Dominance Solvabil-
ity of PR, AV, BR, RU
Although we cannot say whether the sufficient conditions derived above are
also necessary7, we could try and derive sufficient conditions for non DS that
rely only on ordinal information. Dhillon and Lockwood (1999) follow pre-
7This is because the game could be DS even if the sufficient conditions are not satisfied
– recall that we wanted conditions that used information only on ordinal preferences– e.g.
with some utility functions and not with others.
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cisely this approach in the case of PR. We are able to derive these conditions
for NPR but not for the other voting rules.
The sufficient conditions for non Dominance Solvability for AV, BR and
RU are very complicated to characterise. The reason for this is that unlike
in PR and NPR the map from the space of voting profiles V to the space of
Scoring Vectors Ω is not one to one, while it is one to one (upto permutations
between individuals) in the case of PR and NPR. Thus the inverse function
does not exist.
For example ωx = ωy = n;ωz = 0 clearly corresponds to voting pro-
files n(1, 0, 0) + n(0, 1, 0) under PR but in AV it could correspond to either
n(1, 0, 0) + n(0, 1, 0) or to n(1, 1, 0).
We believe that the sufficient conditions will need to take into account
more information than simply the degree of agreement on the best and worst
alternatives. We construct an example for AV using the Condorcet cycle,
to show that the game is not DS when there is sufficient heterogeneity in
preferences:
Example 1 (Non DS of AV)
Let n = 6, n′x = n
′
y = n
′
z = 2, nz = ny = nx and the preferences such that:
1 : x  y  z
2 : x  y  z
3 : y  z  x
4 : y  z  x
5 : z  x  y
6 : z  x  y
In Γ1 the strategies that survive are (1, 1, 0) and (1, 0, 0) for 1 and 2; (0, 1, 0)
and (0, 1, 1) for 3 and 4 and (0, 0, 1) and (1, 0, 1) for 5 and 6. Consider 1 and 2:
strategy (1, 1, 0) is a UBR to (1, 0, 0)+(0, 1, 0)+(0, 1, 1))+2(0, 0, 1). Strategy
(1, 0, 0) is a UBR to e.g (1, 0, 0) + 2(0, 1, 0) + (1, 0, 1) + (0, 0, 1). For players
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3 and 4, strategy (0, 1, 1) is a UBR to 2(1, 0, 0) + (0, 1, 0) + (1, 0, 1) + (0, 0, 1)
and strategy (0, 1, 0) is a UBR to 2(1, 1, 0) + (0, 1, 1) + (0, 0, 1) + (1, 0, 1).
Finally for players 5 and 6, strategy (1, 0, 1) is a UBR to (1, 0, 0) + (1, 1, 0) +
2(0, 1, 0) + (0, 0, 1) while strategy (0, 0, 1) is a UBR to (1, 1, 0) + (1, 0, 0) +
2(0, 1, 1) + (1, 0, 1). Thus, the game is not DS. 
NPR does not come under either of the categories we studied. Indeed,
the conditions of Theorem 3 are not satisfied for NPR (since sr = 1.). Thus
we find the sufficient conditions for this scoring rule as a separate case:
6.2 Negative plurality rule (NPR)
In the NPR voting game players have the following pure strategies: Si =
{(0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1) and (1, 1, 0)}. The following lemma characterises the weakly
dominated strategies in this game.
Theorem 5 (Sufficient conditions for Dominance Solvability): The
NPR game with three alternatives is DS if 2n
3
− 2
3
≤ n′x ≤ 2n3 − 13 , and
preferences in x are polarised.
To prove this result, observe that Proposition 1 implies that Γ1r for r =
NPR consists of strategies that give 1 to the best alternative for all voters.
Thus the undominated game Γ1r has two strategies for each player.
Lemma 8: Consider the undominated game Γ1NPR. If n
′
x ≥ 2n3 − 23 and
preferences in x are polarised, the only undominated strategy for any i 6∈ N ′x
is (0, 1, 1).
Thus, only strategy (0, 1, 1) remains for all i /∈ N ′x, and strategies (1, 1, 0)
and (1, 0, 1) for i ∈ N ′x in the reduced game.
From the above, all i ∈ N ′x give 1 to x (Lemma 1) and all i 6∈ N ′x give 0 to x
(Lemma 2), hence in the game Γ2r, ωx = n
′
x.
Lemma 9: Consider the undominated game Γ2r where ωx = n
′
x. If n
′
x ≤ 2n3 − 13
19
the only undominated strategy for any i ∈ N ′x is one which gives 1 to the best
and 0 to the worst alternative.
Proof of Theorem 5: Proposition 1 shows that the first stage of iterated
deletion leads to the game Γ1r, where only strategies that give 1 to the best
alternative survive. Then Lemma 8 shows that in Γ1 for all i 6∈ N ′x the only
strategy that is not weakly dominated is (0, 1, 1). Finally Lemma 9 shows
that in Γ2r for the remaining voters, i ∈ N ′x, the strategy that gives 1 to the
best and 0 to the worst is the only one that survives. Hence all voters have
exactly one strategy remaining and the game is DS. 
The proposition above gives sufficient conditions for the NPR game to be
DS. Are these conditions necessary as well? As the next proposition shows,
this is not the case. We cannot completely classify the game when preferences
are not polarised.
Theorem 6 (Sufficient condition for Non Dominance Solvability):(i)
If n′x ≤ 2n3 − 53 the NPR game is not DS, (ii) If n′x ≥ 2n3 + 23 and preferences
in x are polarised, the NPR game is not DS.
Of course these two propositions do not establish the necessity of the
conditions for DS. Indeed, the polarisation condition in Theorems 5 and 6
only makes it easier to classify games but is not a necessary condition.
We present an example that shows that the conditions for non Dominance
Solvability are not necessary conditions. Thus the game is not DS even when
the conditions are not satisfied.
Example 2 (NPR): q′x ≥ 23 + 23n , preferences are not polarised and the game
is not DS.
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Let n = 6, n′x = 5 and the preferences such that:
1 : x  y  z
2 : x  y  z
3 : x  y  z
4 : x  y  z
5 : x  y  z
6 : y  x  z
In the game Γ1 the following strategies survive: players 1 − 5 : (1, 1, 0) and
(1, 0, 1) and player 6:(1, 1, 0) and (0, 1, 1). For player 6: strategy (0, 1, 1) is a
UBR to 4(1, 1, 0) + (1, 0, 1) while (1, 1, 0) is a UBR to 5(1, 0, 1). For players
1-5, strategy(1, 1, 0) is a UBR to 4(1, 0, 1) + (0, 1, 1) while (1, 0, 1) is a UBR
to 4(1, 1, 0) + (0, 1, 1). Hence the game is not DS. 
Thus, to summarise, the NPR game is not DS when n′x ≤ 2n3 − 53 , it is DS
when preferences in x are polarised and 2n
3
− 1
3
≥ n′x ≥ 2n3 − 23 and it is not
DS when n′x ≥ 2n3 + 23 , and preferences in x are polarised. Asymptotically,
however the game is DS iff n′x =
2n
3
and preferences are polarised in x, but
obviously there is also the requirement that n′x be an integer. Indeed, we can
show that even when n is “small”, very few NPR games can be classified as
DS. The following proposition shows this:
Taking the integer condition into consideration, note that we need b2n−1
3
c ≥
n′x ≥ d2n−23 e and preferences polarised, for Dominance Solvability. Let
2n− 1 = w. We can write w as 3m+ r where m is an integer and r = 0, 1, 2.
Proposition 2: There exists an n′x such that bw3 c ≥ n′x ≥ dw−13 e iff either
r = 0, or r = 1.
Proposition 3:If the conditions stated in Theorem 5 hold, then (i) if n ≥ 5
a unique CW acw exists but acw is never in the winset (ii) if n = 4 at least
one CW exists and the alternative (s) in the winset is (are) CW.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper we found conditions for three-alternatives voting games to be
DS under NPR, AV, BR and RU voting rules. For NPR game we also found
conditions for the game not to be DS. These conditions are stated in terms of
the largest proportion of voters who agree on which alternative is the worst
(best).
Our results show that Approval Voting performs quite well. The intuition
is that voters have much more flexibility under this rule. Ideally voters need
to be able to choose to maximally differentiate between any two alternatives.
BR does not allow the maximal differentiation. RU does allow it, but also
allows other strategies which turn out never to be needed. The ’good” prop-
erties of AV have been recently studied from another point of view by Brams
and Sanver (2003).
A natural question that arises at this stage is: can we say something more
precise about the relations between the conditions required for Dominance
Solvability of these different scoring rules? The next result tries to answer
this question.
Theorem 7: Whenever the sufficient conditions for Dominance Solvability
for PR are satisfied, so are those for RU and AV. Whenever the sufficient
conditions for Dominance Solvability for BR are satisfied, so are those for
RU and AV. The sufficient conditions for Dominance Solvability for AV and
RU are the same.
The proof is obvious.
From the results in the last section we can compare plurality, negative plu-
rality approval and Borda voting rules using as a criterion the conditions for
the associated voting games to be DS.
The worst in terms of our criterion seems to be NPR. While we cannot show
analytically that whenever the sufficient conditions for Dominance Solvability
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are satisfied for NPR they are also satisfied for AV and RU, we have not found
a counterexample either. Many examples can be constructed where the NPR
game is DS and it turns out that the corresponding AV game (i.e. with the
same preferences) is also DS.
An attractive feature about the PR,AV and RU games is that the iterated
elimination procedure takes a very intuitive form: we use a sequence of iter-
ations that corresponds closely to the reasoning in voters’s minds when they
vote strategically: i.e. the iteration proceeds by elimination of candidates
that everyone knows are effectively not in the race. Thus the steps of iter-
ated elimination correspond to reducing the set of outcomes that can occur!
At every step all voters have the same strategy set. This feature of Plurality
Rule (and AV,RU) makes it eminently suitable to be used in experimental
settings for testing the powers of subjects with regard to iterated dominance
reasoning.
Obviously the main part missing in this paper is necessary conditions for
Dominance Solvability (or at least sufficient conditions for non Dominance
Solvability) so that we could characterise the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions at least for large groups of voters. This proved to be difficult to do
when we move away from scoring rules where the number of strategies is
equal to the number of alternatives.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Proposition 1
Proposition 1 In the game Γr the only strategies that are undominated for
a voter i are those that give cj ≥ sr to his top ranked alternative j ∈ X and
ck ≤ sr to his worst ranked alternative k ∈ X.
Before we prove this proposition, we introduce a lemma:
Lemma 1: Consider a voter i such that x i y i z. Consider two strategies
for such a voter: vi = (cx, cy, cz) and v
′
i = (c
′
x, c
′
y, c
′
z). Then strategy vi is at
least as good as v′i iff cx−cy ≥ c′x−c′y and cx−cz ≥ c′x−c′z and cy−cz ≥ c′y−c′z.
The proof is obvious.
Proof of Proposition 1: Assume, w.l.o.g that x i y i z. The strategies
of voter i are partitioned (upto duplication when sr ∈ {0, 1}) into the fol-
lowing: {(1, sr, 0); (0, sr, 1); (sr, 1, 0); (sr, 0, 1);(1, 0, sr);(0, 1, sr)}, for sr ∈ Sr.
We show (i) that any strategy of the form (0, sr, 1) for a fixed sr is weakly
dominated by strategy (1, sr, 0). By Lemma 1 (1, sr, 0) is at least as good as
(0, sr, 1) : when v−i is chosen so that 1/2 of the voters (except i) use (1, 0, sr)
and 1/2 use (sr, 0, 1) (if n is even then let the extra voter use (sr, 0, 1)), then
ωz(v−i) − ωx(v−i) ≤ 1 − sr, ωy(v−i) = 0. Thus for this profile, (1, sr, 0) is
strictly better than (0, sr, 1). (ii) Assume sr 6= 0 (otherwise the strategies
are not distinct): Any strategy of the form (0, 1, sr) is weakly dominated by
(sr, 1, 0). By Lemma 1 (sr, 1, 0) is at least as good as (0, 1, sr) and we can
construct the same profile v−i as for (i), except that if n is even, let the extra
voter use (0, 1, sr) and all others are evenly divided between the strategies
(1, 0, sr) and (sr, 0, 1) so that ωz(v−i) − ωx(v−i) ≤ sr and ωy(v−i) ≤ 1. On
this profile, (sr, 1, 0) is strictly better than (0, 1, sr). Moreover, if n > 3, y
can never be in the winset with the profile v−i. (iii) Assume sr 6= 1, (other-
wise the two strategies are not distinct). Any strategy of the form (sr, 0, 1)
is weakly dominated by (1, 0, sr). Again, by lemma 1, strategy (1, 0, sr) is
at least as good as strategy (sr, 0, 1). It is strictly better for v−i constructed
above for (i).
This leaves us with strategies of the form {(1, sr, 0); (sr, 1, 0); (1, 0, sr)},
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for sr ∈ Sr. We now show that (i) either strategy (sr, 1, 0) weakly dominates
strategy (sr, 1, 0) for some sr 6= sr or all such strategies are equivalent. By
lemma 1, (sr, 1, 0) is at least as good as (sr, 1, 0) for all sr 6= sr. Either
there exists a profile and an sr such that sr = ωz(v−i) − ωx(v−i) > sr and
ωy(v−i) = 0: In this case, strategy (sr, 1, 0) is strictly better than (sr, 1, 0).
Thus all such strategies can be removed. Or all such strategies (sr, 1, 0) are
equivalent. The removal of such redundant strategies does not change the set
of outcomes that survive iterated elimination (see Marx and Swinkels, 1997):
thus we are left with strategy (sr, 1, 0) in any case. (ii) Either strategy
(1, 0, sr) weakly dominates strategy (1, 0, sr) for some sr 6= sr or all such
strategies (1, 0, sr) are equivalent. By lemma 1 strategy (1, 0, sr) is at least
as good as all strategies (1, 0, sr) for all sr 6= sr. If there exists a profile v−i
such that 1− sr = ωz(v−i)−ωx(v−i) > 1− sr and ωy(v−i) = 0, then (1, 0, sr)
weakly dominates (1, 0, sr). We can thus remove such strategies. If there
does not exist any such profile for any sr 6= sr, then all such strategies are
equivalent, and we can choose to eliminate all except (1, 0, sr). (iii) Finally
(since we can choose the order of elimination) we choose to let strategies
(1, s, 0) remain, even if some might be dominated.
.
A.2.Scoring Rules with sr <
1
2 Lemma 2: Assume sr < 1/2. If
nz >
n(2−sr)
3(1−sr) then W ⊂ {{x}, {y}, {xy}}.
Proof of Lemma 2: By proposition 1 the maximum score that z can get
in any profile is ωz = nz(sr) + (n−nz)1. Suppose to the contrary that z was
in the winning set for some profile v: the minimal score z requires would be
in the case that it ties with x and y. Note that the minimum sum of scores
over profiles is Σr = n(1 + sr), while the maximum sum of scores possible
when z ties with x and y is ωx(v) + ωy(v) + ωz(v) = 3(nz(sr) + (n − nz)1).
If nz >
n(2−sr)
3(1−sr) then ωx(v) + ωy(v) + ωz(v) < Σr, a contradiction. Moreover
nz ≤ n implies that sr ≤ 1/2. The case sr = 1/2, is discussed in Section 3
(Borda Rule). Hence we need sr < 1/2, for the Lemma to hold.

Corollary to Lemma 2: If sr =
1
2
, and nz = n then W (v) ∈ {{x}, {x, y}, {y},
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{x, y, z}}, for all v ∈ V .
Proof of Corollary to Lemma 2: When sr =
1
2
, then it is possible that z is
in the winning set.But this is only possible if it ties with x and y. Suppose not:
it is sufficient to look at cases where W (v) = {x, z} or W (v) = {y, z}. W.l.o.g
let W (v) = {x, z} for some v ∈ V then max(ωx(v) + ωz(v)) = 2(max(ωz)) =
2(n
2
) = n < n(1+ 1
2
). Since n(1+ 1
2
) ≤ Σ(v) ≤ n(1+sr) for all profiles v ∈ V ,
this is a contradiction.

Lemma 3: Consider a voter i ∈ Nz such that x i y i z. Assume
W ⊂ {{x}, {y}, {xy}}. Then either (i) the strategy (1, 0, sr) weakly dom-
inates strategies (1, sr, 0) and (sr, 1, 0) for sr > 0, or (ii)all strategies of i are
equivalent.
Proof of Lemma 3: (i) Let vi = (1, 0, sr), v
′
i = (1, sr, 0), and v
′′
i = (sr, 1, 0).
Let v = (vi, v−i), v′ = (v′i, v−i), v
′′ = (v′′i , v−i). If W (v) = {x}, then clearly
W (v′) ⊂ {{x}, {y}, {x, y}}, since the score for x must be the same while
that for y may increase if sr > 0. Also if W (v) = {x}, then clearly W (v′′) ⊂
{{x}, {y}, {x, y}}, since the score for x goes down given v−i if sr < 1 while
that for y increases. If W (v) = {y}, then clearly W (v′) = {y}, since the
score for x must be the same while that for y may increase if sr > 0. Also
if W (v) = {y}, then clearly W (v′′) = {y}, since the score for x does not
increase given v−i if sr ≤ 1 while that for y increases. Finally if W (v) =
{xy}, then W (v′) ⊂ {{y}, {x, y}}, since the score for x must be the same
while that for y may increase if sr > 0. Also if W (v) = {xy}, then clearly
W (v′′) ⊂ {{y}, {x, y}}, since the score for x goes down given v−i if sr < 1
while that for y increases.
Thus no matter what v−i is, the strategy (1, 0, sr) is weakly better for
i given that W ⊂ {{x}, {y}, {xy}}. The strategy (1, 0, sr) is strictly better
than v′i (that is, if sr 6= 0) if there exists a v−i such that 1 > ωy(v−i) −
ωx(v−i) ≥ 1 − sr, or if there exists a v−i such that 1 = ωy(v−i) − ωx(v−i) >
1− sr.
Similarly the strategy vi is strictly better than the strategy v
′′
i if there
exists a profile such that 1 > ωy(v−i) − ωx(v−i) ≥ sr − 1, or if there exists
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a v−i such that 1 = ωy(v−i) − ωx(v−i) > sr − 1. If any of these strategies
exists in the game Γ1r then strategy vi weakly dominates strategy v
′
i and v
′′
i
respectively.
If such profiles do not exist, then any pair of such strategies must be
equivalent in the sense that W (vi, v−i) = W (v′i, v−i),∀vi, v′i ∈ Vi.

Lemma 4: Consider a voter i 6∈ Nz such that z i x i y. Assume W ⊂
{{x}, {y}, {xy}}. Then either (i) the strategy (1, 0, sr) (denoted vi) weakly
dominates strategies (0, sr, 1) (denoted v
′
i) and (sr, 0, 1) (denoted v
′′
i ) for sr >
0, or (ii) all strategies of i are equivalent.
Proof of Lemma 4: (i) Let v = (vi, v−i), v′ = (v′i, v−i), v
′′ = (v′′i , v−i).
(A)If W (v) = {x}, (i.e. ωy(v−i)−ωx(v−i) < 1) then clearly W (v′) = {x},
if (i)ωx(v−i)−ωy(v−i) > sr, W (v′) = {x, y}, if (ii) ωx(v−i)−ωy(v−i) = sr,and
(iii)W (v′) = {y}, if ωx(v−i)− ωy(v−i) < sr.
(B)IfW (v) = {x, y}, (i.e. ωy(v−i)−ωx(v−i) = 1) then clearlyW (v′) = {y},
since given that ωy(v−i)− ωx(v−i) = 1, ωx(v−i) < ωy + sr, for any sr ∈ Sr.
(C)If W (v) = {y}, (i.e. ωy(v−i)−ωx(v−i) > 1) then clearly W (v′) = {y},
since given that ωy(v−i)− ωx(v−i) > 1, ωx(v−i) < ωy + sr, for any sr ∈ Sr.
Thus no matter what v−i is, the strategy vi is weakly better for i given that
W ⊂ {{x}, {y}, {xy}}. The strategy vi is strictly better than v′i if there exists
a v−i such that ωy(v−i)−ωx(v−i) < 1 and ωx(v−i)−ωy(v−i) = sr, or ωx(v−i)−
ωy(v−i) < sr (Cases A (ii) and (iii) respectively), or if ωy(v−i)− ωx(v−i) = 1
(Case (B).) If any of these profiles exist then strategy vi weakly dominates
strategy v′i. If no such profile exists the two strategies are equivalent.
Now we consider strategy v′′i :
(A’)If W (v) = {x}, (i.e. ωy(v−i)−ωx(v−i) < 1) then clearly W (v′′) = {x},
if ωy(v−i) − ωx(v−i) < sr, W (v′) = {x, y}, if ωy(v−i) − ωx(v−i) = sr, (for
sr < 1), and W (v
′) = {y}, if ωy(v−i)− ωx(v−i) > sr.
(B’)If W (v) = {x, y}, (i.e. ωy(v−i) − ωx(v−i) = 1) then clearly W (v′) =
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{y}, since given that ωy(v−i) − ωx(v−i) = 1, ωy(v−i) − ωx(v−i > sr, for any
sr < 1.
(C’)Finally if W (v) = {y}, (i.e. ωy(v−i) − ωx(v−i) > 1) then clearly
W (v′) = {y}, since given that ωy(v−i)− ωx(v−i) > 1, ωy(v−i)− ωx > sr, for
any sr ∈ Sr.
The strategy vi is strictly better than the strategy v
′′
i if there exists a
profile such that ωy(v−i) − ωx(v−i) < 1 and ωy(v−i) − ωx(v−i) = sr, (for
sr < 1), or ωy(v−i) − ωx(v−i) > sr (Cases (A’)(ii) and (iii) respectively) or
ωy(v−i) − ωx(v−i) = 1 (Case (B’)). If any of these profiles exists strategy vi
weakly domimates strategy v′′i . If no such profile exists then the two strategies
are clearly equivalent, i.e. they give the same outcome for all profiles v−i. 
A.3.Scoring Rules with sr >
1
2
Lemma 5: If n′x >
n(1+sr)
3sr
then L ∈ {{y}, {z}, {y, z}}.
Proof of Lemma 5: Suppose to the contrary that ∃v ∈ V such that x ∈
L(v). Then, since all i ∈ N ′x give a minimum of sr to x we have: min(ωx) =
n′xsr. If x ∈ L, ωy ≥ ωx, ωz ≥ ωx. Thus, min(ωx+ωy+ωz) ≥ 3n′xsr > n(1+sr)
since n′x >
n(1+sr)
3sr
, a contradiction.

Corollary 2 to Lemma 5: If sr =
1
2
and n′x = n then L ∈ {{y}, {z},{x, y, z},{y, z}}.
Proof of Corollary to Lemma 5: It is sufficient to show that {x, y} and
{x, z} cannot be in the losing set. W.l.o.g suppose L(v) = {x, y} for some
v ∈ V. Then ωx(v) = ωy(v) < ωz(v). Since n′x = n, min(ωx(v)) = n2 , so
that min(ωx(v) + ωy(v) + ωz(v) >
3n
2
, a contradiction, since Σ(v) ≤ 3n
2
when
sr =
1
2
. 
Lemma 6: Let i ∈ N ′x, such that x i y i z. If L ⊂ {{y}, {z}, {y, z}},
then either (a) strategies vi = (sr, 1, 0) and v
′
i = (1, sr, 0) are both weakly
dominated by strategy v˜i = (1, sr, 0) or (b) all strategies are equivalent for i.
Proof of Lemma 6: By Proposition 1, strategies for such an individual i
in Γ1r are (1, 0, sr); (1, sr, 0); (sr, 1, 0), where sr ∈ [sr, sr].
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Using Lemma 1, we can deduce that the probability that x is in the
winning set cannot decrease relative to other alternatives in the winning set
when i uses strategy (1, sr, 0) instead of strategy (sr, 1, 0) or (1, sr, 0) (since
cx − cy and cx − cz are both greater with strategy v˜i than with strategies vi
and v′i).
This means that whenever W (v) = {x}, then W (v˜) = {x}, when W (v) =
{x, y} then W (v˜) ∈ {{x, y}, {x}}; when W (v) = {x, z}, then W (v˜) ∈
{{x}, {x, z}}.
Similarly, whenever W (v′) = {x}, then W (v˜) = {x}, when W (v′) =
{x, y} , then W (v˜) ∈ {{x, y}, {x}}; when W (v′) = {x, z}, then W (v˜) ∈
{{x}, {x, z}}.
So the only cases to check are W ∈ {{y}, {z}}. If W (v) = W (v′) = {z}
when i uses strategy vi, or v
′
i then i can do no worse with strategy v˜i. Thus
the only case to check is when W = {y} when i uses strategy vi or v′i.
Thus consider strategy vi first. If W (v) = {y}, then ωy(v−i) + 1 >
ωx(v−i) + sr, and ωy(v−i) + 1 > ωz(v−i). If he uses v˜i then the outcome could
be {y} (if ωy(v−i) + sr > ωx(v−i) + 1 or {x, y} (if ωy(v−i) + sr = ωx(v−i) + 1),
or {x}. The outcomes {z} or {y, z}, are ruled out since ωx + sr > ωz by
Comment 1.
If a profile v−i exists such that W (v) = {x, y} and W (v˜) = {x}; or
W (v) = {x, z}, and W (v˜) = {x} or W (v) = {z} and W (v˜) = {x} or
W (v˜) = {x, z} then strategy v˜i weakly dominates strategy vi.Otherwise the
two are equivalent.
The same argument applies to v′i. The outcomes {z} or {z, y} are ruled
out by Comment 1, so if W (v′) = {y} then W (v˜) ∈ {{x}, {x, y}}.
If a profile v−i exists such that W (v′) = {x, y} and W (v˜) = {{x}} or
W (v′) = {x, z}, and W (v˜) = {{x}} or W (v′) = {z} and W (v˜) = {x} or
W (v˜) = {x, z} then strategy v˜i weakly dominates strategy vi.Otherwise the
two are equivalent.

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Lemma 7: In the game Γ2r, if sr < 1, and n
′
x >
n
2−sr then the Scoring rule
game is DS and x is the unique winner.
Proof: The reduced game Γ2r is the game where all i ∈ N ′x have strate-
gies (1, 0, sr) and (1, sr, 0) remaining. This implies that min(ωx) = n
′
x,
max(ωy, ωz) = n
′
x(sr) + (n − n′x). Thus W = {x} if n′x > n′xsr + n − n′x,
i.e. if n′x >
n
2−sr . 
Corollary to Lemma 7: In the game Γ2r if sr <
1
2
, then if n′x >
2n
3
, the game
is DS and x is the unique winner.
Proof: Denote n′t =
n
2−sr . By Lemma 7 the game is DS and x is the unique
winner if n′x > n
′
t. Since sr ∈ [0, 12), supn′t = 2n3 . Thus the condition n′x > n′t
is always satisfied if n′x >
2n
3
. 
A.4 Negative Plurality Rule
Lemma 8: Consider the undominated game Γ1NPR. If n
′
x ≥ 2n3 − 23 and
preferences in x are polarised, the only undominated strategy for any i 6∈ N ′x
is (0, 1, 1).
Proof of Lemma 8: W.l.o.g. consider i ∈ N ′z. Preferences are polarised so
we have z i y i x. By Proposition 1 his remaining strategies in Γ1r are
(1, 0, 1) and (0, 1, 1). The strategy (1, 0, 1) is a UBR whenever i is pivotal
between candidates z and y only8, i.e. the strategy (1, 0, 1) is a UBR to the
following profiles: (i) ωy = ωz ≥ ωx + 1, or (ii) ωy − ωz = 1 and ωz ≥ ωx + 1,
or possibly (iii) ωy − ωz = 1 and ωz ≥ ωx, (if the lottery over (x, y, z) is
preferred by i to y).
The strategy (0, 1, 1) is a UBR whenever i is pivotal between candidates x
and y only9, i.e. the strategy (0, 1, 1) is a UBR to the following profiles: (i)’
ωx = ωy ≥ ωz + 1, or (ii)’ ωx − ωy = 1 and ωy ≥ ωz + 1, or possibly (iii)’
ωy − ωx = 1 and ωx ≥ ωz, (if the lottery over (x, y, z) is less preferred by i
to y). Similarly the strategy (0, 1, 1) is a UBR to the following profiles: (iv)’
ωx = ωz ≥ ωy + 1 or (v)’ ωx − ωz = 1 and ωz ≥ ωy or (vi)’ωx = ωy = ωz. In
8I.e. he cannot achieve the outcome x for sure with his vote, only in a lottery.
9I.e. he cannot achieve his best outcome z with his vote but he can achieve either
outcome x or y.
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all other profiles v−i, the two strategies give the same payoff. Since there are
only two pure strategies, it is sufficient to show that 6 ∃ v−i such that strategy
(1, 0, 1) is a UBR and ∃ v−i such that (0, 1, 1) is a UBR. Claim 1 proves the
former and Claim 2 proves the latter.
Claim 1 (Lemma 8): If n′x ≥ 2n3 − 23 , then 6 ∃ v−i such that either of (i), (ii)
or (iii) holds.
Proof: If such a profile exists, it must exist for the minimum ωx possible
i.e. when ωx = n
′
x. Thus it is sufficient to consider this case. Assume ∃ v−i
such that either of (i), (ii) or (iii) holds. Case (i) implies that min Σ(v−i) =
3n′x + 2, case (ii) implies that min Σ(v−i) = 3n
′
x + 1, and case (iii) implies
that min Σ(v−i) = 3n′x + 3. If n
′
x ≥ 2n3 − 23 for cases (i), (ii) and (iii) we have
that min Σ(v−i) > 2n− 1 > 2n− 2, a contradiction.

Claim 2 (Lemma 8). If n′x ≥ 2n3 − 23 then ∃ v−i such that strategy (0, 1, 1) is
a UBR.
Proof: We construct a strategy v−i such that (0, 1, 1) is a UBR. In particular,
we construct a strategy v−i such that either (i)’ or (ii)’ holds.
Let ωx = n
′
x + n
′
y + dn
′
z−1
2
e, ωy = n′x + n′y + bn
′
z−1
2
c, ωz = n′z − 1, then clearly
Σ(v−i) = 2n − 2, hence this profile is feasible10. So the only thing to check
is that strategy (0, 1, 1) is a UBR. Suppose n′z is odd: then ωx = ωy and we
need (from (i)’): ωx ≥ ωz + 1, i.e. n′z ≤ 2n3 − 13 . If n′z is even: ωx − ωy = 1,
and we need (from (ii)’) ωy ≥ ωz, i.e n′z ≤ 2n3 . Thus, if n′z ≤ 2n3 − 13 , then this
profile exists for both cases.
Thus, it remains to show that if n′x ≥ 2n3 − 23 then n′z ≤ 2n3 − 13 . Observe that
n′x + n
′
y + n
′
z = n. Hence, if n
′
x ≥ 2n3 − 23 , we have that max(n′z) ≤ 1n3 + 23 .
Moreover, since n ≥ 3, note that n
3
+ 2
3
≤ 2n
3
− 1
3
.

10Take (1, 1, 0) for all i ∈ N ′x, N ′y, and if n′z − 1 is even divide voters in N ′z equally in
to those using (0, 1, 1) and those using (1, 0, 1), and if n′z − 1 is odd take n
′
z
2 voters in N
′
z
using (1, 1, 0) and n
′
z
2 − 1 using (1, 0, 1).
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Lemma 9: Consider the undominated game Γ2r where ωx = n
′
x. If n
′
x ≤ 2n3 − 13
the only undominated strategy for any i ∈ N ′x is one which gives 1 to the best
and 0 to the worst alternative.
Proof of Lemma 9: Let i ∈ N ′x. W.l.o.g let x i y i z. We show that
strategy (1, 0, 1) is dominated by (1, 1, 0). The strategy (1, 0, 1) is a UBR
to the following profiles: (i) ωx = ωy ≥ ωz + 1, or (ii) ωy − ωx = 1 and
ωx ≥ ωz + 1, or possibly (iii) ωy − ωx = 1 and ωx ≥ ωz, (if the lottery over
(x, y, z) is preferred by i to y).
The strategy (1, 1, 0) is a UBR to the following profiles: (i)’ ωx = ωz ≥ ωy+1,
or (ii)’ ωy −ωx = 1 and ωx ≥ ωz, (if the lottery over (x, y, z) is less preferred
to y.) or (iii)’ ωz = ωy and ωy ≥ ωx + 1, (iv)’ ωz − ωy = 1 and ωy ≥ ωx, (v)’
ωz−ωy = 1 and ωy ≥ ωx + 1,and (vi)’ ωz = ωy = ωx. In all other profiles v−i,
the two strategies give the same payoff. It is sufficient to show (since there
are only two pure strategies) that 6 ∃ v−i such that strategy (1, 0, 1) is a UBR
and ∃ v−i such that (1, 1, 0) is a UBR. Claim 1 proves the former and Claim
2 proves the latter.
Claim 1 (Lemma 9): If n′x ≤ 2n3 − 13 , then 6 ∃ v−i such that either of (i), (ii)
or (iii) holds.
Proof: Since i ∈ N ′x, we know that ωx = n′x − 1. Assume ∃ v−i such
that either of (i), (ii) or (iii) holds. Case (i) implies that max Σ(v−i) =
3n′x − 4, case (ii) implies that max Σ(v−i) = 3n′x − 3, and case (iii) implies
that max Σ(v−i) = 3n′x− 2. If q′x ≤ 23 − 23n for cases (i), (ii) and (iii) we have
that max Σ(v−i) < 2n− 4 < 2n− 2, a contradiction.
Claim 2 (Lemma 9). If n′x ≤ 2n3 − 13 then ∃ v−i such that strategy (1, 1, 0) is
a UBR.
Proof: We construct a strategy v−i such that (1, 1, 0) is a UBR. In particular
we construct v−i such that one of (iii)’or (iv)’holds.
Let ωz = n
′
y +n
′
z + dn
′
x−1
2
e, ωy = n′y +n′z + bn
′
x−1
2
c, ωx = n′x− 1, Then clearly
Σ(v−i) = 2n − 2, hence this profile is feasible11. So the only thing to check
11Take (0, 1, 1) (the only surviving strategy) for all i /∈ N ′x and if n′x − 1 is even divide
voters in N ′x equally in to those using (1, 1, 0) and those using (1, 0, 1), and if n
′
x − 1 is
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is that strategy (1, 1, 0) is a UBR. Suppose n′x is odd: then ωy = ωz and we
need (from (iii)’): ωy ≥ ωx + 1, i.e. n′x ≤ 2n3 − 13 . If n′x is even, then we need
(from (iv)’) ωy ≥ ωx, i.e n′x ≤ 2n3 . Thus, if n′x ≤ 2n3 − 13 , then at least one of
these profiles exists and (1, 1, 0) is a UBR.

Theorem 6 (Sufficient condition for Non Dominance Solvability):(i)
If n′x ≤ 2n3 − 53 the NPR game is not DS, (ii) If n′x ≥ 2n3 + 23 and preferences
in x are polarised, the NPR game is not DS.
Proof of Theorem 6: (i) It is sufficient to show that every strategy in Γ1r
is a UBR to some profile v−i. We show this w.l.o.g for i ∈ N ′x12. W.l.o.g
assume x i y i z. Strategy (1, 0, 1) is a UBR to the following profile:
ωx = n
′
x − 1 + n′y + bn
′
z
2
c, ωy = n′x − 1 + n′y + dn
′
z
2
e, ωz = n′z. This is clearly
feasible and it remains to check that ωx ≥ ωz+1. If n′z is even, then this is so if
n′z ≤ 2n3 − 43 , and if n′z is odd, it requires n′z ≤ 2n3 − 53 . Thus if n′z ≤ n′x ≤ 2n3 − 53 ,
then strategy (1, 0, 1) is a UBR. Similarly strategy (1, 1, 0) is a UBR to the
following profile: ωx = n
′
x− 1 + n′z + bn
′
y
2
c, ωz = n′x− 1 + n′z + dn
′
y
2
e, ωy = n′y.
This is clearly feasible and it remains to check that ωx ≥ ωy+1. If n′y is even,
then this is so if n′y ≤ 2n3 − 43 , and if n′y is odd, it requires n′z ≤ 2n3 − 53 . Thus
if n′y ≤ n′x ≤ 2n3 − 53 , then strategy (1, 1, 0) is a UBR.
(ii) Since n′x >
2n
3
− 2
3
, by Proposition 1 and Lemma 8, we are in game Γ2r
where all i 6∈ N ′x have only strategy (0, 1, 1) remaining (recall that preferences
are polarised in x). It is sufficient to show that for all i ∈ N ′x, strategies
(1, 1, 0) and (1, 0, 1) are both UBR to some profile v−i, in Γ2. We show this
w.l.o.g for i ∈ N ′x such that x i y i z. Strategy (1, 0, 1) is a UBR to
the following profile: Let n′x − 1 − (n′y + n′z) of i ∈ N ′x vote (1, 1, 0); and
the remaining n′y + n
′
z of them vote (1, 0, 1). Obviously, all i 6∈ N ′x vote
(0, 1, 1). Note that n′x − 1 ≥ (n′y + n′z), (since n′x ≥ 2n3 + 23 ≥ n2 + 12) and
ωx + ωy + ωz = 2n − 2 so this profile is feasible. Moreover in this profile,
ωx = ωy ≥ ωz + 1 iff n′x ≥ 2n3 + 23 . Strategy (1, 1, 0) is a UBR to the following
profile: Let n′x − 1 − (n′y + n′z) of i ∈ N ′x vote (1, 0, 1); and the remaining
odd take n
′
x
2 voters in N
′
x using (1, 0, 1) and
n′x
2 − 1 using (1, 1, 0).
12Since n′x = maxa=x,y,z(n
′
a).
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n′y + n
′
z of them vote (1, 1, 0). Obviously, all i 6∈ N ′x vote (0, 1, 1). Note that
n′x − 1 ≥ (n′y + n′z), and ωx + ωy + ωz = 2n − 2 so this profile is feasible.
Moreover in this profile, ωx = ωz ≥ ωy + 1 iff n′x ≥ 2n3 + 23 .

Proposition 2: There exists an n′x such that bw3 c ≥ n′x ≥ dw−13 e iff either
r = 0, or r = 1.
Proof of proposition 2: First we show that if r = 0, 1, there exists an
n′x satisfying the required inequality. If r = 0, bw3 c = m = dw−13 e, since
dw−1
3
e = m− b1
3
c = m.
If r = 1, bw
3
c = m+ b1
3
c = m. dw−1
3
e = m, since w − 1 = 3m.
It remains to show that when r = 2, there does not exist an n′x satisfying the
above:Suppose ∃ an n′x that satisfies the above. Then we need bω3 c ≥ dω3 e.
If r = 2, we have bw
3
c = m+ b2
3
c = m, and dw−1
3
e = m+ d1
3
e = m+ 1, since
w − 1 = 3m+ 1, a contradiction.
.
Proposition 3:If the conditions stated in Theorem 5 hold, then (i) if n ≥ 5
a unique CW acw exists but acw is never in the winset (ii) if n = 4 at least
one CW exists and the alternative (s) in the winset is (are) CW.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let 2n
3
− 2
3
≤ n′x ≤ 2n3 − 13 , and preferences in x be
polarised. (i) It is easy to check that if n′x ≥ 2n3 − 23 and n ≥ 5 then n′x > n2
therefore, x is the unique CW. Lemma 2 and lemma 3 imply that : ωx = n
′
x,
ωy = n−n′x +nz and ωz = n−n′x +ny where na(n′a) is the number of voters
who rank a as the worst (best) alternative. Now assume that x is in the
winset. If x is in the winset ⇒ ωx > ωy and ωx > ωz since nx + ny + nz = n
and nx = n − n′x (preferences in x are polarised) this implies that n′x > 2n3
which is a contradiction. Thus, x is never in the winset.

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